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MULTIMARKET CONTACT EXTERNALITIES: THE EFFECT OF RIVALS’ 
MULTIMARKET CONTACTS ON FOCAL FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Abstract  
Given that firms develop their activities in a network of multiple players, interfirm 
rivalry is not only a matter of direct competitors, but also of indirect competition. In spite of 
this, the literature on competitive dynamics tends to focus on analyzing rivalry as an exclusive 
function of the competitive relationship between a focal firm and its direct rivals. In this 
article, we extend competitive dynamics literature by considering how focal firms are affected 
by the relationships of their rivals with third-party firms. Specifically, we study the effect that 
the multimarket contacts of rivals produces on the performance of the focal firm. Additionally, 
we incorporate the idea that there are different strategic options for operating in an industry 
that affect the intensity of multimarket contact externalities. Our results show that 
multimarket contact among firms causes externalities that indirectly affect firms that are not 
directly involved in this competitive relationship. We find that multimarket contact 
externalities differ between and within strategic groups. 
 
Keywords 
Multimarket contact externalities, strategic group, mutual forbearance, rivalry, performance 
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MULTIMARKET CONTACT EXTERNALITIES: THE EFFECT OF RIVALS’ 
MULTIMARKET CONTACTS ON FOCAL FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Interfirm rivalry occupies a central place in strategic management research (Hitt, 
Ireland & Hoskisson, 2007). Although important contributions have been made in this field, 
competitive dynamics research continues to be constrained by an approach that only analyses 
the focal firm (Tsai, Su &Chen, 2011). Most works analyze interfirm rivalry exclusively as a 
function of the competitive relationship between the focal firm and its rivals. However, given 
that firms develop their activities in a network of multiple players, interfirm rivalry may also 
depend on the behaviour of firms with which the focal firm does not maintain a direct 
competitive confrontation. Much less effort has been devoted to evaluating how a focal firm 
is affected by the competitive relationships of its rivals with other firms. In this article, we go 
deeper into the effects of competition on firm performance by analyzing how the competitive 
relationships of rivals may indirectly affect the focal firm. In order to achieve this, we focus 
on a specific type of competitive relationship: the one that is based on multimarket contact.  
It is generally accepted that high levels of rivalry trigger market dynamics that 
eventually lead to reduced profitability for firms involved in competitive relationships (Porter, 
1985). Accordingly, it is in the interest of firms to find mechanisms to reduce rivalry (Porter, 
1985; Scherer & Ross, 1990). One of the many mechanisms by which a firm can reduce 
rivalry is by establishing a high level of multimarket contact against its potential attackers. 
Multimarket theory analyzes the competitive relationships between firms that share several 
markets (Bernheim & Winston, 1990; Edwards, 1955; Jayachandran, Gimeno &Varadarajan, 
1999). It states that when two firms coincide in multiple markets, their competitive behaviour 
changes (Fu, 2003; Greve, 2008). For instance, high levels of multimarket contact may help 
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firms to appreciate the strategic interdependences arising between them and to refrain from 
intense competition (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Spagnolo, 1999). This is what has come to 
be called mutual forbearance (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985)  
Multimarket contact theory has been developed from the perspective of the firms that 
are directly involved in multimarket competition. Consequently, empirical measures usually 
refer to the dyad of firms under analysis (Baum & Korn, 1996; Baum & Korn, 1999) or 
aggregate the contacts that the focal firm maintains with all its direct competitors (Fuentelsaz 
& Gómez, 2006). This implies that, in general, it is assumed that the focal firm is exclusively 
influenced by its own multimarket contacts. In this article, we extend our understanding of 
multimarket competition theory by exploring how a focal firm may be affected by the 
multimarket relationships of other firms, i.e., by analyzing how multimarket contacts may 
spread their effects to other firms that are not directly involved in a particular competitive 
relationship. 
The types of situations examined in this paper may be described with an example. Let 
A and B be two firms that are competing in a given set of markets. Extant research on 
multimarket contact has analyzed the consequences of the relationship between A and B on 
their performance. Let C be a third firm that has a high degree of market overlap with B, but 
that it is not necessarily competing in the same markets as A. Our contention is that firm A 
may benefit from the reduction in aggressiveness between B and C as a consequence of the 
multimarket contact existing between the latter two firms. In other words, our contention is 
that, if firms external to the relationship between a focal firm and its rivals (firm C, in the 
example) behave aggressively, the focal firm (firm A) is negatively affected as a consequence 
of the change in the competitive conditions of its rival (firm B, in our example). Conversely, 
if firms external to the relationship (firm C) refrain from competing aggressively due to high 
multimarket contact with a rival of the focal firm (firm B), the focal firm (firm A) will 
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indirectly benefit from this reduction in rivalry. So we will discuss how a focal firm may 
receive a positive or negative effect from the multimarket contacts of other firms that operate 
in its market. We refer to these indirect influences as multimarket contact externalities. 
We explore multimarket contact externalities in a context in which firms are 
heterogeneous in their strategies. Instead of being uniformly distributed across the strategic 
space, firms tend to converge around a finite number of strategic configurations (Romanelli, 
1991; Short, Payne & Ketchen, 2008). As a result, it is possible to identify groups of firms 
that occupy a similar strategic position within an industry. Firms within a strategic group are 
similar to the members of their group, but they are strategically different from firms that 
belong to other groups. In a context where multiple strategic positions are viable, a firm’s 
competitive moves will have a different effect depending on its strategic configuration vis a 
vis that of its rivals. Firms operating from a particular strategic position will experience this 
effect more intensely. A firm would be especially negatively influenced by an increase of 
competitive moves that affect its key strategic dimensions, and it would benefit especially 
from a reduction of competitive moves that affect them. This means that multimarket contact 
externalities that stem from firms occupying a similar strategic position will be more intense 
because similar rivals generate or inhibit movements aimed at the strategic dimensions that 
are relevant to the focal firm. 
This research is conducted on the Spanish banking sector in the period 1999-2009. This 
context is especially suitable for our framework because two important conditions coexist. 
First, firms operate simultaneously in several geographical markets, which guarantees 
multimarket competition. Second, firms operating in this sector use different approximations 
to the provision of financial services (Espitia, Polo & Salas, 1991; Más-Ruiz & Ruiz-Moreno, 
2011, Zúniga et al, 2004). Therefore, this setting is an ideal scenario to explore the effect of 
multimarket contact externalities in a framework of several homogeneous groups of firms.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on 
multimarket contact theory. In Section 3, we develop our hypotheses. In Section 4, we present 
our research setting. Section 5 presents the results of our empirical analyses. Finally, Section 
6 concludes the article with the discussion of the main implications of our findings. 
2. MULTIMARKET CONTACT THEORY 
Multimarket contact theory describes the competitive dynamics that take place among 
firms that compete against each other across several markets (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985 
p.87). In the last few years, this theory has gained momentum among strategic management 
scholars because of its capability to explain competitive behaviour and performance (Anand 
et al, 2009; Greve, 2008; Guedri & McGuire, 2011; Prince & Simon, 2009; Upson et al., 2012; 
Yu, Subramaniam & Canella, 2009). At first glance, a coincidence in multiple markets may 
increase the possibility of direct competition. However, multimarket contact theory argues 
that, on the contrary, multimarket rivals tend to refrain from aggressive competitive 
interaction in their common markets. This is what has come to be called the “Mutual 
Forbearance Hypothesis" (Fu, 2003; Greve, 2008; Jans & Rosenbaum, 1997; Parker & Roller, 
1997; Spagnolo, 1999; Bernheim & Whinston, 1990). This hypothesis relies on two 
mechanisms: deterrence and familiarity (Jayachandran et al, 1999). 
Deterrence stems from the increased retaliatory capabilities of multimarket rivals. 
Multimarket competition implies that firms can respond to an aggression in a given market 
with an attack in one or more of the other markets in which both firms operate. As a result, 
the chance of achieving an advantage in one market is balanced against the high risk of 
retaliatory responses, reducing the motivation to initiate competitive actions (Chen, 1996). 
The second argument, familiarity, focuses on the social construction of competition. 
Familiarity stems from a mutual understanding of resources and capabilities among 
multimarket rivals and their shared competitive history (Chen and Miller, 1994; Jayachandran 
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et al., 1999). Multimarket contact is a mechanism that helps to transmit strategic information 
by increasing direct exposure to the strategic actions of rivals with high market overlap 
(Boeker et al, 1997). The increased familiarity of multimarket rivals makes it easier for them 
to realize their interdependences, facilitating the establishment of tacit non-aggression 
agreements among them. 
Several papers in the multimarket literature defend a linear relationship between 
multimaket contact and rivalry (Fu, 2003; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Gimeno & Woo, 1999; 
Greve, 2008). Accordingly, increases in multimarket contact would result in a better 
performance for multimarket rivals. However, a few researchers have suggested that the 
relationship between multimarket contact and the intensity of rivalry may be represented as an 
inverted-U shape (Baum & Korn, 1999; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006; Haveman & 
Nonnemaker, 2000; Stephan et al, 2003). These authors argue that, when multimarket contact 
is low, firms have incentives to establish a foothold in the market domain of rivals to signal 
their capacity to defend themselves from aggressive competitive moves (Karnani & 
Wernerfelt, 1990). These initial actions may provoke similar reactions from competitors, 
increasing the number of multimarket contacts (Baum & Korn, 1999). As the number of 
contacts increases, the mechanisms for mutual forbearance are triggered. Therefore, above a 
certain level of multimarket contacts, firms reduce their entry rate into their rivals’ markets. 
Initial evidence of an inverted-U shape in the relationship between multimarket contact and 
competitive behaviour has been found for market entry rates (Baum & Korn, 1999; Fuentelsaz 
& Gómez, 2006; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Stephan et al, 2003), exit rates (Baum & 
Korn, 1999) and growth rates (Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000). 
There are reasons to believe that the inverted-U shape may also be found in other 
measures of rivalry. Research on rival identification and competitive dynamics has 
demonstrated that market overlap is a key driver of competitive tension (Chen, 1996; Chen et 
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al., 2007; Peteraf & Bergen, 2003). As firms coincide in many markets, their dependence on 
similar resources increases, and there is a greater likelihood of vying for the same productive 
factors and customers (Hannan &Freeman, 1989). Eventually, firms develop high levels of 
competitive tension that can result in competitive actions (Chen et al., 2007). From this 
perspective, multimarket contact increases the possibilities of competitive aggression, leading 
to greater rivalry. However, following the theory of multimarket competition, after a certain 
multimarket contact threshold, competition decreases. As multimarket rivals begin to realize 
their interdependences, the mechanisms for mutual forbearance are triggered and multimarket 
rivals avoid competitive escalation. As a consequence, the relationship between multimarket 
contact and rivalry may show an inverted-U shape for other measures of rivalry: for low 
levels of multimarket contact, there is a process of competitive escalation that results in a 
direct negative relationship between multimarket contact and rivalry while, for high levels of 
multimarket contact, mutual forbearance appears and the relationship is reversed. Evidence 
consistent with this relationship has recently been found in the Spanish banking sector 
(Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2012) and in the European telecommunications industry (Fuentelsaz et 
al, 2012). 
3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Multimarket contact externalities  
Firms have many alternatives when preparing competitive actions. They may take the 
form of price changes, marketing and promotional campaigns, new products, market entry, 
capacity additions, legal actions and signaling actions (Baum & Korn, 1996; Ferrier, Smith & 
Grimm, 1999; Young, Smith & Grimm, 1996). Some of these actions are directed at a 
particular rival  and their influence is restricted to that firm. For example, legal actions such as 
patent litigation focus on a targeted rival (or set of rivals). In contrast, many other competitive 
actions are localized within specific product and market contexts (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001; 
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Nayyar, 1993). These competitive actions have an effect on all the firms that operate in the 
product-market segment affected by the competitive move. For instance, Derfus et al., (2008) 
found that the number of actions in an industry had a negative effect on the performance of a 
focal firm, irrespective of whether it was the intended target or not. Therefore, firms are 
influenced not only by their own capability to attract, or deter, competitive actions, but also 
by the capability of other firms in their markets to do so. Previous literature has shown that 
multimarket contact is an important determinant of rivalry. Depending on its level, it can 
enhance or reduce competitive intensity. At low levels of multimarket contact, firms tend to 
ignore their interdependences, but still perceive each other as direct competitors. In this 
situation, multimarket contact and competition are directly related: market overlap implies 
dependence on similar factors and, consequently, competitive pressure (Chen, 1996; Chen et 
al., 2007; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Competitive pressure facilitates competitive escalation 
(Baum & Korn, 1999; Chen et al., 2007), which frequently leads to the use of competitive 
moves based on short-run variables, such as price (Kang et al., 2010), whose effect on 
performance is detrimental to all the firms operating in the market segment in which the 
competitive move takes place. Although these movements may target certain rivals, given that 
their effects are not always controllable, they may affect all the firms that operate in the 
attacked market. Therefore, for low levels of multimarket contact, not only the firms involved 
in multimarket competition, but also other firms operating in their markets may face 
competitive escalation. 
Competitive escalation is reversed once multimarket contact is high enough to allow the 
recognition of competitive interdependences. Deterrence and familiarity mechanisms are 
triggered by multimarket contacts, reducing rivalry levels (Jayachandran et al., 1999). This 
means that multimarket rivals will be unwilling to initiate competitive actions in the markets 
where they coincide. However, it is important to stress that this does not necessarily mean that 
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multimarket rivals do not compete at all. Sometimes the consequences of multimarket contact 
are reflected in the type of competition that takes place between rivals. Firms with high levels 
of multimarket contact are more likely to use long-run variables like product introductions, 
instead of short-run variables such as prices, to compete (Kang et al., 2010). Similarly to the 
previous case, the lower competition that is a consequence of mutual forbearance may not be 
focused narrowly enough to benefit only multimarket rivals, but may also benefit all market 
participants (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990). In these situations, multimarket rivals would act 
as a shield that protects all the market participants by inhibiting competitive moves. 
Hence, multimarket rivals may generate competitive escalation or induce mutual 
forbearance in a certain market depending on their level of multimarket contacts. This is what 
we have termed multimarket contact externalities: damages or benefits received by a firm in 
the form of higher or lower rivalry not because of their own multimarket contacts, but due to 
the multimarket contacts of other firms in its markets. Competition among Ford Motor 
Company, General Motors Corporation (GM) and Chrysler provides an example of 
multimarket contact externalities. If we analyze the situation from the perspective of Ford, 
multimarket contact with GM may be conceived as high enough to seek mutual forbearance, 
while multimarket contact with Chrysler may be considered as low enough to initiate 
processes of competitive escalation. Given that competition spillovers make it difficult for 
Ford to aggressively compete against Chrysler and forbear with GM, Ford might refrain from 
attacking Chrysler to avoid disrupting mutual forbearance with GM (Upson & Ranft, 
2010:52). In this situation, Chrysler would receive a positive externality that stems from the 
multimarket contact between Ford and GM. 
The effect of multimarket contact externalities on firm performance depends on the 
influence of multimarket contact on rivalry. Given that rivalry has a negative effect on firm 
performance (Porter, 1985; Scherer & Ross, 1990), when multimarket contact between rivals 
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induces competitive escalation, multimarket contact externalities will have a negative impact 
on firm performance. Conversely, if multimarket contact reduces rivalry by inducing mutual 
forbearance, multimarket contact externalities will exert a positive influence on the 
performance of the other firms that operate in the same markets. Accordingly, we predict a U-
shaped relationship between the performance of a focal firm and the multimarket contacts of 
other firms operating in its market. For low levels of multimarket contacts, the relationship 
will be negative, and for high levels, it will turn positive. 
Hypothesis 1: The multimarket contact of the firms operating in the markets of a focal 
firm will have a U-shaped effect on a focal firm’s performance 
3.2 Multimarket contact externalities and strategic similarity 
The firms that operate in an industry are heterogeneous in their strategies, goals, 
structures, targeted customers and the resources they use for their activities (Carroll & 
Swaminathan, 2000; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Meyer, Tsui & Hininigs, 1993; Short, Payne 
& Ketchen, 2008). Strategic groups are a specific type of intra-industry configuration that are 
usually defined as sets of firms that follow a similar strategy across a set of relevant strategic 
dimensions (Porter, 1980: 129). The literature on strategic groups and its underlying ideas, 
based on strategic similarity, have frequently been used in the analysis of rivalry (see, for 
example, Deephouse, 1999). One of the most recurrent arguments appearing in this literature 
is that rivalry between and within strategic groups has a different intensity (Barney &  
Hoskisson, 1990; Caves &  Porter, 1977; Peteraf, 1993).  
Strategic group theory seems naturally suited to a joint analysis with multimarket 
theory. In fact, several papers in the multimarket contact literature have integrated the 
strategic similarity of firms with measures of their market overlap (see, for example, Gimeno 
& Woo, 1996; Young et al., 2000; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006; Upson et al., 2012). Thus, 
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considering strategic groups in the context of multimarket contact externalities seems an 
adequate extension. We argue that the strategic similarity between a focal firm and other firms 
operating in its market explains the intensity of the multimarket contact externalities received 
by the focal firm. In other words, we argue that the transference of the detrimental or 
beneficial effect of the competitive relations of the rivals of a given firm depend on the 
configuration of the industry in strategic groups. In particular, we argue that the intensity of 
the competitive spillovers will be different between and within strategic groups.  
Our contention is that similar rivals will deter (or provoke) competitive actions that are 
likely to have an effect on strategic dimensions that are central to the focal firm, whereas 
competitive moves deterred (or provoked) by dissimilar rivals will probably affect strategic 
dimensions that are not central to the focal firm. For instance, let firms A, B and C be three 
firms that coincide in a certain market. Firm A and firm B focus on traditional banking while 
firm C focuses on innovative banking. If firm B receives an attack, it means that some (or 
even all) of the activities related to traditional banking in that market will be affected. Given 
that firm A shares the strategic position of B on traditional banking, firm A will also be 
directly affected by competitive moves against that strategic position. On the other hand, if 
firm C is attacked, the innovative banking position is damaged in that market. In this situation, 
firm A will be significantly less affected by any competitive move because innovative 
banking is not a central strategic dimension of its activities. Consequently, from the 
perspective of firm A, the effect of multimarket contact externalities generated by firm B will 
be greater than the effect of multimarket externalities generated by firm C. Figure 1 
graphically depicts this hypothetical situation.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
---------------------------------- 
The previous reasoning means that firms of the same strategic group operating in the 
focal firm’s markets produce more intense multimarket contact externalities. Members of a 
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strategic group that maintain a low level of multimarket contact with their rivals and, 
therefore, compete intensively against them, might attract competitive moves targeted at the 
specific strategic configuration of the group. This would negatively affect other group 
participants that operate in the same market as the firm under attack. On the contrary, firms 
that have a high level of multimarket contact with their rivals and, as a result, impede 
competitive escalation, will inhibit competitive moves that would directly affect their strategic 
group. In this case, the fact that some group participants benefit from mutual forbearance 
creates a positive externality that improves the competitive conditions of the group members 
that operate in the same markets. Regarding multimarket externalities in a context of strategic 
groups, our second hypothesis establishes that:  
Hypothesis 2: The effect of the multimarket contact of other firms operating in the 
markets of a focal firm will be more intense if they belong to the same strategic group as the 
focal firm. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Research context, sample and data sources 
This research is conducted in the context of the Spanish retail banking sector between 
1999 and 2009. This is an interesting setting for our analysis because both multimarket 
competition and different strategic positions are present. First, the multilocal and 
multibusiness nature of Spanish retail banking guarantees that firms compete simultaneously 
in several markets (Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006). Second, intra-industry heterogeneity, in the 
form of groups of homogeneous firms that differ among themselves, has been extensively 
documented (Espitia, Polo & Salas, 1991; Más-Ruiz & Ruiz-Moreno, 2011; Zúniga et al, 
2004).  
The number of banks included in the sample fluctuates between 163 and 124 depending 
on the year. This fluctuation is mainly explained by mergers and acquisitions that take place 
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over the period analyzed. The sample excludes banks that do not exceed four branches in any 
of the years because this is associated with extreme geographical specialization and 
insignificant retail activities. Some of these organizations may still be of considerable size. 
However, as they offer their products exclusively to certain types of customers (e.g., banks 
with a high investment profile, banks of professional associations) they are not included in the 
sample. The sample also excludes banks without headquarters in Spain because they do not 
publish enough information for our analysis on their activities in the Spanish subsidiary. It is 
important to note that large international banks that carry out retail banking activities in the 
country have established their headquarters in Spain, so the sample does not exclude large 
players in the sector. It should also be taken into account that most international banks 
without their headquarters in Spain do not have an important presence. Therefore, many of the 
banks not considered because of insufficient data would also have been excluded because of 
the irrelevance of their retail banking activities (i.e., four branches or fewer). In spite of these 
exclusions, our sample is clearly representative of the Spanish retail banking sector. For 
instance, it includes 97.8 percent of the total assets held in 2009. 
The data used in this study have been collected from several sources. First, we gather 
information about every branch located in Spain from the Guia de la Banca, Cooperativas de 
Crédito y Cajas de Ahorro, which is published yearly by Editorial Maestre Ediban. It offers 
information about the location of every branch in the sector, allowing us to identify their 
addresses and zip codes. Second, we obtain information about financial statements from 
yearbooks published by the different trade associations in the sector. Finally, information 
about market level factors and other macroeconomic variables is obtained from the Statistical 
Bulletin of the Bank of Spain and from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
 
 
 15
4.2 Methodology 
We empirically test our predictions in two steps. First, we identify strategic groups in 
the Spanish retail banking sector. Then, we test the effect of multimarket contact externalities 
on focal firm performance  
4.2.1. Identification of strategic groups 
The first step in the identification of strategic groups is to define the strategic 
configuration of each firm in the industry. Following the traditional approach in strategic 
management, the market positions of firms are considered as a function of firm scope and 
resource commitment (Cool & Schendel; 1987; Mehra, 1996; Ferguson, Deephouse & 
Ferguson, 2000). Decisions about scope include the choice of market segments, while 
resource commitment involves the assignment of human, capital and financial factors. In this 
article, the strategy of each firm is described through seven variables based on scope and 
resource commitments dimensions. All of them have been employed in previous analyses of 
the Spanish banking sector (Zuñiga et al, 2004; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006; Prior & Surroca, 
2006).  
The strategic scope of a given firm is measured through the following five variables: 
 (1) Commercial banking (Commercial loans/Financial investments): This ratio captures 
the banks’ orientation towards commercial banking. This strategic orientation is usually 
characterized by a high percentage of loans to domestic economies and small and 
medium-sized firms. 
  (2) Investment banking (Portfolio of securities/Financial investments): This variable 
determines the extent of a banking firm’s orientation towards active investments in stock 
markets.  
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 (3) Institutional banking (Treasury/Financial investments): This ratio indicates an 
institutional orientation. Firms that develop this kind of strategy tend to lend money to 
public institutions.  
 (4) Net position in the financial system (Net position in the financial markets/Total 
liabilities): This ratio refers to the bank’s position in the interbank market. Specifically, it 
captures the bank’s degree of trust in this market to obtain funds.  
 (5) Traditional banking (Saving and deposits accounts of the private sector/Total 
liabilities): This variable identifies the traditional and conservative banking business, 
based on the accumulation of family savings. These firms get funds through classical 
financial products. 
Similarly, resource commitment is captured through two ratios: 
 (6) Human capital (Personnel expenses/Operating income): This variable captures the 
importance of human capital. 
 (7) Risk (Net insolvencies/Operating income): This measure tries to approximate the 
degree of risk that the firm is exposed to. It reflects loans with a low probability of being 
recovered. 
Commercial, investment and institutional banking variables distinguish between three 
kinds of Spanish banking entities according to their tendency in the provision of financial 
funds. Firms with a commercial orientation tend to lend funds to domestic economies and 
small and medium-sized firms, investment banking firms focus on investments in stock 
markets and firms with an institutional orientation mainly lend money to public institutions. 
The other two variables of strategic scope, net position in the financial system and traditional 
banking, differentiate between two kinds of Spanish banking entities according to how they 
obtain their financial resources. While traditional entities use classical financial products to 
acquire funds, the net position in the financial markets refers to the firms that mainly borrow 
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money from the interbank market. Finally, human capital shows how Spanish banking firms 
commit human resources to developing their activities and risk proxies the risk profile of the 
strategy followed by each firm. Human capital refers to the role that human resources play in 
the provision of financial services and risk describes the degree of risk to which the financial 
entity is exposed.  
After identifying the strategic position of all the firms in the Spanish retail banking 
sector, we group them according to the similarity in their strategies. We use cluster analysis to 
place each firm into one strategic group. Although this methodology is subject to some 
criticism (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Barney & Hoskisson, 1990; Hatten & Hatten, 1987), 
it has been commonly used to identify groups of similar firms in the strategic management 
literature (Kim & Lee, 2002; Smith et al, 1997; Short et al, 2007). Following recent advice on 
improving the use of cluster analysis, before applying it, we use a two-step procedure 
intended to provide a higher empirical accuracy in the subsequent classification of firms. Thus, 
we eliminate outliers and, after then, we standardize all the variables. 
First, we use the BACON algorithm (Blocked Adaptive Computationally Efficient 
Outlier Nominators), which is an algorithm proposed by Billor, Hadi, and Velleman (2000) to 
identify outliers. BACON is an appropriate algorithm for our study because it allows us to 
recognize outliers in multivariate data. Following prior research (Bush & Sinclair, 1991; 
Ferguson, Deephouse & Ferguson, 2000), we eliminate 12 outliers before initiating the cluster 
analysis procedure. All firms identified as outliers show an orientation toward private banking 
and investment activities. Given that our focus is on commercial banking, all these exclusions 
seem to be sound. Second, we transform the seven strategic variables to a common scale via 
z-scores to avoid scale differences giving rise to a skewed identification of groups (Cool, 
1985; Cool & Schendel, 1987). Our study identifies strategic groups in each of the years 
studied, 1999-2009. 
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After that, we apply a two-step cluster analysis procedure. Using a two-step process is 
convenient because it increases the validity of cluster solutions (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). 
Step one uses hierarchical clustering to determine both the number of groups and their cluster 
centroids. We select Ward’s method as the agglomerative technique and measure the 
proximities between the variables using squared Euclidean distances. Step two employs the 
cluster centroids as “seed points” for a non-hierarchical clustering procedure (i.e., K-means). 
As a consequence, the two-step cluster procedure eliminates problems associated with random 
seed setting. 
We use visual inspection of tree-plots (Ketchen et al., 1993; Miles, Snow, & Sharfman, 
1993) to define the number of clusters appropriately. The number of clusters is confirmed by 
using the Calinski–Harabasz (1974) pseudo-F index. Milligan and Cooper (1984) evaluate 30 
stopping rules, singling out the Calinski–Harabasz index as one of the best. Finally, ANOVA 
was used to test whether average performance levels persistently differ among strategic 
groups. We analyze differences in three performance measures: ordinary profitability, 
exploitation profitability and profitability before taxes. The results confirm that the groups 
have a different average profitability in each period, providing further support for the 
classification1. 
4.2.2 Variables and model specification 
Dependent variable: Our dependent variable is financial performance. We measure it 
through an accounting-based measure, return on assets (ROA), which is computed as the ratio 
of ordinary profitability over total assets. ROA has frequently been used as a measure of 
financial performance when analyzing the banking sector (Barnett, Greve & Park, 1994; 
Roberts & Amit, 2003). Each kind of bank was subject to the same accounting requirements, 
so their financial statements are comparable. 
                                                 
1 Information about the number, size and composition of the groups, as well as the results from the ANOVA 
analyses are available from the authors upon request. 
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Independent variables: Our main independent variable is multimarket contact 
externalities. This variable is measured as the average number of markets in which the rivals 
of a focal firm coincide with their competitors. We first calculate the multimarket contact of 
each firm in the sector. Multimarket contact is calculated as the average number of markets 
where a firm coincides with its rivals, as follows: 
 
where Rivalsi is the number of rivals of firm i. We consider a firm as a rival if it coincides 
with the focal firm in at least one geographical market. Coincidencesij is the number of 
markets in which a focal firm i and its rival j operate simultaneously. We define markets at 
the lowest level of disaggregation we can identify, i.e., the ZIP Code. Each ZIP code 
identifies geographically proximate areas. Large towns have many codes, while a few small 
villages can share the same ZIP code. For instance, the city of Madrid had 63 zip codes in 
2009, while the code 28430 included three different municipalities in the province of Madrid. 
Applying zip codes to approximate geographical markets provides a very detailed analysis of 
the interactions of banks, given that our sample covers up to 5913 different areas. In 2009, the 
number of branches per zip code ranged from 1 to 148 and the average number of branches in 
a zip code was 7. Finally, Wij is a weighting factor used to reflect that multimarket rivals are 
more important the larger the number of markets in which they coincide with the focal firm. It 
is calculated as follows: 
 
Once we have calculated a multimarket contact variable for each firm, the variable 
multimarket contact externalities is calculated as the accumulated multimarket contact of the 
rivals of the focal firm (excluding the contacts with the focal firm). We calculate multimarket 
externalities in aggregated terms because we consider that the externalities generated by each 
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rival add value to the degree to which the focal firm is indirectly affected by the behaviour of 
other firms. Thus, our conception of the variable supposes that multimarket contact 
externalities are the result of aggregating externalities that come from all the direct rivals.  
WijxMMCjiesExternalitMMC
j
i   
where 
 
Therefore, multimarket contact externalities reflect the accumulated multimarket 
contact of the rivals operating in the markets of the focal firm. The measure takes into account 
the different importance of rivals for the focal firm, those present in a larger proportion of the 
markets of the focal firm being more important. This variable is introduced in a quadratic 
form to test hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 maintains that multimarket contact externalities that come from firms of 
the same strategic group are more intense than the ones coming from members of another 
group. The variable MMC externalities similar rivals reflects the multimarket contacts 
externalities generated by firms that belong to the same strategic group. The variable MMC 
externalities different rivals captures the multimarket contacts externalities that stem from 
firms of other strategic groups. Both variables are also introduced in quadratic form.  
Control variables: Our specification includes three controls at market level. We include 
credits, measured as the aggregated credits of the provinces where the focal firm operates (in 
thousands of Euros). This variable approximates the total demand for banking activities. 
Unemployment describes the unemployment rate in the provinces in which the bank operates, 
which is a factor that may affect the demand for banking activities. Note that both variables, 
credits and unemployment, are market controls at the province level instead of at the zip code 
level. The lack of this information at the zip code level forces us to use the province level as 
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an approximation. Finally, number of rivals captures the number of firms with which the focal 
firm coincides in, at least, one geographical market. This variable allows us to control for two 
facts. First, the number of rivals approximates competitive intensity. Second, it considers that 
firms with a high number of rivals may receive more externalities.  
We also include several firm-level controls. Inefficiency, measured as the ratio of 
exploitation costs over ordinary margin and risk, measured as the ratio of total credits over 
total assets, which are specific variables of the banking sector (Carbó, del Paso &  Fernández, 
2003). Given that there were a number of mergers and acquisitions in the period analysed, our 
model includes the variables M&A and Post M&A. The first is a dummy variable which takes 
the value 1 for the year in which the firms are involved in a merger or acquisition and 0 
otherwise. The second is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 in the period after the 
M&A. We also control for size, which is measured as the logarithm of total assets. Finally, our 
model includes the variable multimarket contact. In accordance with the literature, the 
variable is included in its quadratic form to capture a potential U-shaped effect (Fuentelsaz & 
Gómez, 2012; Fuentelsaz, Maicas & Gómez, 2012). By including this variable, we control for 
the effect of the multimarket contacts of the firm itself. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
between variables are shown in Table 1. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 around here 
---------------------------------- 
Model specification: To choose the appropriate specification we run a number of tests. 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test rejects the null hypothesis that the variance of 
firm-level effects is zero. This is interpreted as evidence of individual effects (X2=1146.80 
and p-value<0.00 in the model that considers the externalities coming from all the rivals; 
X2=1224.26 and p-value<0.00 in the model that differentiates the effect of multimarket 
externalities in a context of strategic groups). The Hausman test indicates the presence of 
fixed effects (X2=424.44 and p-value=0.00 in the model that takes into account the 
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multimarket externalities of all the rivals; X2=384.48 and p-value=0.00 in the model that 
considers strategic groups). Furthermore, the model includes year dummies to control for 
contemporary shocks common to all the firms in the sector. As a consequence, we estimate a 
two-way fixed effects model. 
5. RESULTS 
The results of our estimations are shown in Table 2. We test our hypotheses in columns 
1 to 3. Columns 4, 5, 6 and 7 present robustness analyses. Column 1 shows the baseline 
model. It is globally significant, confirming the importance of our controls. Column 2 
introduces the direct and squared effect of multimarket contact externalities (hypothesis 1). 
Both variables are significant  and their introduction slightly improves the fit of the model, as 
the portion of the variance explained indicates (bottom of the table). Column 3 differentiates 
between multimarket contact externalities produced by firms that are members of the same 
group from those that belong to other strategic groups (hypothesis 2). We introduce the direct 
and the squared effects of both multimarket contact externalities of similar firms, which 
measures the externalities produced by the members of the group of the focal firm, and 
multimarket contact externalities of different firms, which captures the externalities generated 
by rivals of other strategic groups.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 around here 
---------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 1 states that multimarket contact externalities have a U-shaped effect on 
focal firm performance. The parameter of the direct effect is negative (β=-0.00533; p<0.01) 
and the parameter of the squared effect is positive (β=0.0618; p<0.01). This suggests the 
predicted U-shaped effect but for this U-shape to be meaningful in our estimations, the 
inflection point has to belong to the range of values of multimarket contact externalities 
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observed in our sample. The inflection point corresponds to the value 431.229 of the variable, 
which falls within the range of our sample. 
Therefore, our estimations show that the multimarket contacts of focal firms’ rivals 
have a U-shaped effect on focal firm performance. As a consequence, hypothesis 1 is 
supported. Graph 1 depicts the effect of multimarket contact externalities within the range of 
values of our sample. As the graph shows, the influence of multimarket contact externalities 
generated by all the rivals is negative until certain threshold and, then, it becomes positive as 
the extent of multimarket contact externalities increases. Based on these findings, we can 
conclude that the worst situations are those in which firms face moderate levels of 
multimarket externalities. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Graph 1 around here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that the U-shaped effect of multimarket contact externalities is more 
intense when it comes from firms of the same strategic group. The variable multimarket 
contact externalities of similar rivals presents a negative direct effect (β=-0.00382; p<0.00) 
and a positive squared effect (β=0.140; p<0.00) and the variable multimarket contact 
externalities of different rivals presents a negative direct influence (β=-0.00299; p<0.05) and 
a positive squared effect (β=0.0528; p<0.00). These results confirm that the effects of the 
multimarket externalities generated by both similar and different rivals adopt a U-shape. 
Graph 2 depicts the effect of the multimarket contact externalities for the range of variation of 
the variable in our sample by considering strategic group membership.  
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Graph 2 around here 
---------------------------------- 
The solid line shows the effect of multimarket externalities proceeding from rivals that 
are group members and the dotted line shows the influence that comes from multimarket 
externalities generated by rivals of others strategic groups. As the graph shows, with the 
exception of the cases in which the value of multimarket contact externalities is low, the solid 
line is clearly above the dotted line, which means that the influence of multimarket contact 
externalities originated by similar rivals is more intense. The inflection point of the effect that 
comes from similar rivals is 136.43 and the inflection point of multimarket externalities 
generated by different rivals is 283.14. This, in addition to confirming the U-shaped effect, 
indicates that the level of rivals’ multimarket contacts necessary to benefit from multimarket 
externalities is higher when these rivals belong to other strategic groups. Therefore, this 
finding supports hypothesis 2.  
Columns 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Table 2 show the robustness of our results. Firms with a very 
high level of multimarket contact, because of their wide geographical scope, might also face 
rivals with high levels of multimarket contact. In these cases, the positive effect of 
multimarket contact externalities could be artificially generated by a firm’s own multimarket 
contact. Consequently, we test hypotheses 1 and 2 in a reduced sample in which we require 
the effect of a focal firm’s own multimarket contact to be below the sample average. As 
columns 4 and 5 show, the results of the main estimations are qualitatively unchanged, and 
even the magnitude of the coefficients is similar. Therefore, the multimarket contacts of the 
focal firm are not the mechanism through which our results are obtained. 
Finally, columns 6 and 7 show the robustness of our results by considering the current 
financial crisis. In 2008, an international financial crisis broke out and affected banking 
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sectors all over the world2. The change in external conditions that the crisis introduced 
modified the activities of the banks. To check whether this crisis modifies our results, 
columns 6 and 7 show the estimations of the fully specified models restricted to the period 
(1999-2007). Again, the results of the main theoretical variables are qualitatively unchanged 
and the magnitude of the coefficients is similar. Therefore, the financial crisis does not seem 
to affect our findings.  
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
When designing competitive actions, firms may target a specific rival. However, very 
often, it is not possible to limit the scope of competitive actions and, thus, to control who will 
be affected by them. As a consequence, competitive moves, do not only affect targeted rivals 
but also others firms operating in the same markets (Derfus et al., 2008). Therefore, when 
defining their competitive strategies, firms should consider all the firms operating in the 
market in which competitive actions will take place to anticipate potential outcomes and 
reactions. In this article, we take into account these competitive spillovers study the effects of 
multimarket contact more deeply. 
Multimarket contact theory states that firms modify their competitive behaviour when 
they coincide with their rivals in several markets simultaneously. The literature is prolific in 
examples of situations in which firms mutually forbear as a result of their multimarket 
interdependences. However, as we show in this article, the effect of multimarket contact can 
spill over to other firms that coincide with multimarket firms, even if they compete in only 
one or a few markets. We contribute to the field of multimarket theory by exploring how a 
focal firm is influenced by the multimarket contacts of its direct competitors with other firms. 
We term this effect multimarket contact externalities. We argue that rivals with low 
multimarket contact levels are likely to attract competitive actions that will also eventually 
                                                 
2 Although there is no oficial starting point of the current financial crisis, the Bankrupt of Lehman Brothers on 
14 September of 2008 could be considered as its beginning.  
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harm the focal firm. Conversely, rivals with high multimarket contact levels deter competitive 
actions in their markets, which benefits the other firms operating in those markets. 
Our analysis confirms the existence of multimarket contact externalities. We find that 
the multimarket contacts of the rivals of a focal firm with third parties have a significant 
effect on the focal’s firm performance. Particularly, we find that when the multimarket 
contacts accumulated by competitors are low, the focal firm’s performance decreases. 
Conversely, when the firm coincides in the market with rivals with high multimarket contact 
levels, it benefits from their strong multimarket positions. Therefore, our results suggest that 
firms with strong multimarket contact positions act as a "shelter" that protects other firms 
operating in their markets, irrespective of their own multimarket position. As a result, the 
performance of these firms improves. This finding complements received theory in the 
multimarket contact research stream which, until now, has focused on a focal firm and the 
consequences of its own multimarket contacts. 
We further explore the role of multimarket contact externalities by analyzing how they 
are influenced by strategic similarity, a dimension that is intimately related to market overlap 
(Chen, 1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006). To do so, we explore multimarket contact 
externalities in a context of strategic groups. We find that the intensity of multimarket contact 
externalities varies depending on whether they come from members of the same strategic 
group of the focal firm or from members of other groups. Particularly, we find that similar 
rivals transfer the effect of their own multimarket contact more intensively than firms of 
others strategic groups. This implies that firms benefit more from the "shelter" provided by 
rivals that are strategically similar to them than from more dissimilar rivals. 
Previous research has suggested that multimarket contact generates externalities in the 
other firms that operate in the same markets as multimarket organizations (e.g., Baum & Korn, 
1996; Upson & Ranft, 2010). It has been argued that, when a firm faces rivals with low levels 
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of multimarket contact, they concentrate their efforts in competitive exchanges between them 
and, therefore, their capacity to attack other firms is restricted. Thus, firms located close to 
these multimarket organizations would benefit from a lower competitive intensity. However, 
the argument continues, once multimarket firms establish strong multimarket contact 
positions and begin to mutually forbear between them. As a result, they can divert competitive 
resources from the multimarket arena to their local markets. All this is contrary to the 
reasoning proposed in this research: rivals with low multimarket contact levels will generate 
positive externalities, while high multimarket contact levels among the rivals of the focal firm 
will lead to negative outcomes. This alternative perspective is theoretically sound and 
empirically appealing. However, to the best of our knowledge, it has not yet been empirically 
tested.  
These two different predictions can be reconciled by considering the characteristics of 
the actions that define the competitive patterns in the industry under analysis. Particularly, the 
specific form of multimarket contact externalities may depend on whether competitive actions 
affect only targeted rivals or whether they affect all the firms in a market. The perspective 
described in the previous paragraph (i.e., the competitive release perspective), requires that 
attacks only affect the targeted rival. In this case, multimarket rivals engaged in fierce 
competition will only damage each other and mutually deplete their competitive resources, 
which eventually benefits third parties. Conversely, when multimarket rivals mutually forbear, 
they can focus on competitive interaction against their single market rivals. However, in our 
proposed framework (i.e., the shelter perspective), attacks (e.g., price reductions, new product 
introduction) affect all the firms operating in the market to some degree. In this context, 
multimarket firms that mutually forbear cannot freely initiate competitive attacks because 
they may elicit retaliatory responses from multimarket rivals operating in the attacked market. 
Conversely, multimarket firms with low multimarket contacts may attract attacks that also 
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affect single market rivals. Therefore, in contexts where attacks exclusively affect the targeted 
rival, multimarket contact externalities should be consistent with the competitive release 
perspective whereas, in industries where attacks cannot be concentrated on targeted rivals, the 
shelter perspective should be adopted. 
We suspect that the characteristics of competitive actions may be systematically 
related to certain properties of the industry. In high technology, knowledge-intensive sectors, 
such as pharmaceutics, software or nanotechnology, standard attacks may include patent-
litigation, pre-emption of emerging submarkets and technologies and obstructive patenting. 
The effects of these attacks are likely to be limited to the targeted rival. Therefore, two firms 
engaged in fierce competition would concentrate their efforts in their dyadic interaction, and 
third parties would barely be harmed. In such a context, we would expect multimarket contact 
externalities to follow the competitive release perspective. In contrast, in low technology 
sectors or sectors with homogeneous products, such as the banking sector, it will be difficult 
for firms to restrict the effects of their competitive actions and multimarket contact 
externalities will show a pattern consistent with the shelter perspective. 
Multimarket contact externalities and strategizing 
The existence of multimarket contact externalities implies interesting strategic 
opportunities3. Conventional wisdom suggests that a competitively weak firm (e.g., one with 
outdated capabilities, inadequate resource endowment or lack of institutional endorsement) 
should be both a poor defender and a poor attacker. However, if such a firm is located in a 
market characterized by high multimarket contact externalities (for instance, because strong 
multimarket organizations are operative), it may benefit from a reduced probability of being 
attacked. In addition, such a firm may be able to concentrate its resources to initiate 
competitive actions. For instance, a firm operating in a market in which multimarket contact 
                                                 
3 We assume that the effects of any attacks cannot be restricted to the targeted rival. If this is true, our proposed 
shelter perspective will apply to multimarket contact externalities. 
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externalities soften competitive activity may enter new geographical markets with aggressive 
strategies, being confident that its home market will not be subject to retaliatory responses. 
Therefore, multimarket contact externalities may provide firms with a safe place from which 
to launch attacks or even to begin expansive strategies. 
The traditional perspective of multimarket contact theory seems to be useful only for 
"big players". Multimarket firms tend to be large and diversified organizations that, in 
addition to scale and scope economies and size-based market power, are able to build strong 
multimarket positions that offer them the advantages of mutual forbearance with other major 
players in the industry. Small single-market firms cannot benefit from multimarket dynamics. 
However, in the presence of multimarket contact externalities, small players also have the 
opportunity (and necessity) to design a strategy to benefit from multimarket contact 
dynamics. Interestingly, rather than designing a strategy to build their own multimarket 
position (with its associated risks and costs), these firms should try to identify ways to free-
ride the multimarket positions of major players. Therefore, we can propose two different 
kinds of multimarket strategies: strategies based on building multimarket positions, for large 
firms, and strategies based on the exploitation of multimarket contact externalities, for smaller 
and non-diversified firms. While the first kind of strategy is broadly developed in the 
literature, the second kind may have been overlooked because the reasearch does not consider 
multimarket contact externalities.  
Limitations and future research 
In this research, we argue that many conventional competitive actions hurt not only the 
intended target, but also other firms that operate in the same markets. This characteristic of 
competitive actions is what, eventually, would determine the form taken by multimarket 
contact externalities. Accordingly, it may be interesting to develop a typology of competitive 
actions in terms of the extent to which they affect targeted rivals. As described above, certain 
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structural characteristics of an industry may be correlated with the characteristics of 
competitive actions. As a result, it may be interesting to develop a typology of industries in 
which usual competitive actions show certain characteristics (e.g., the kind of multimarket 
contact externalities). Such a typology would be helpful for both practitioners and scholars to 
better understand the effects of competitive strategies and to predict potential reactions more 
accurarately. 
 One limitation of this research is that we have not observed actual competitive 
patterns. Instead, we have inferred them through their observed effects on focal firm 
performance. The results are consistent with our predictions. However, they may be 
strengthened with analyses of actual competitive moves. For instance, some researchers have 
applied content analysis techniques to different sectorial and economic publications to 
identify competitive actions. These techniques would be useful to identify whether actual 
competitive patterns are consistent with multimarket contact externalities, lending further 
support to their existence and importance. Similarly, market entry patterns could be analyzed 
to determine whether multimarket contact externalities influence entry decisions. For 
instance, small and non-diversified organizations may show a preference for entry into 
markets dominated by strong multimarket organizations, despite their potentially high 
capabilities. Conversely, large multimarket organizations may avoid those markets or, at best, 
prefer small-scale, non-aggressive entry in order to establish footholds and improve their 
multimarket position (Ghemawat & Thomas, 2008; Upson et al., 2012). 
Conclusion 
Multimarket contact theory has traditionally focused on how firms’ multimarket 
contacts influence their competitive behaviour and their performance. In this article, we show 
that multimarket contact dynamics spill over to other firms that operate in the same markets 
as these multimarket rivals, even when they are not directly involved in multimarket 
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competition. We call this effect multimarket contact externalities. We also find that these 
externalities vary depending on whether they come from strategically similar or dissimilar 
rivals. Our findings open new avenues for multimarket contact theory research and suggest 
that even small players in an industry may have the opportunity to design a multimarket 
strategy. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Mean 3.32 207348.9 11.50 62.71 0.68 0.68 0.02 14.13 7.48 217.61 62.33 127.48 
S.D. 1.27 174571.8 4.67 40.22 0.63 0.18 0.13 1.80 8.91 155.11 88.62 113.89 
Minimum -2.10 0 0 0 -0.23 0 0 9.73 0 13.70 0 0 
Maximum 14.06 661894.4 30.20 164 12.63 0.99 1 19.30 60.49 874.73 740.67 740.26 
1.ROA 1.00            
2.Credits -0.23 1.00           
3.Unemployment 0.06 0.03 1.00          
4.Number of rivals -0.32 0.69 0.02 1.00         
5.Inefficiency 0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.16 1.00        
6.Risk -0.15 -0.04 0.06 0.11 -0.20 1.00       
7.M&A -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.18 -0.03 -0.02 1.00      
8.Log(assets) -0.35 0.72 -0.01 0.83 -0.17 0.07 0.18 1.00     
9.MMCi -0.25 0.64 0.04 0.63 -0.11 0.09 0.16 0.73 1.00    
10.MMC externalities -0.10 0.45 0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.19 1.00   
11.MMC externalities similar rivals -0.23 0.44 0.17 0.35 -0.09 0.14 0.02 0.31 0.43 0.50 1.00  
12.MMC externalities different rivals -0.21 0.12 -0.07 0.13 -0.11 0.30 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.57 0.07 1.00 
 
Table 2: The effect of multimarket contact externalities on focal firm performance 
ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.0148*** 0.0118** 0.00942** 0.0151** 0.0123* 0.0113** 0.0130** 
Creditsa 
(2.91) (2.49) (2.05) (2.09) (1.70) (2.15) (2.46) 
-0.0183 -0.0251** -0.0246** -0.0401** -0.0432*** -0.0220* -0.0182 Unemployment (-1.61) (-2.10) (-2.17) (-2.36) (-2.75) (-1.66) (-1.39) 
-0.00424 -0.0000534 0.00117 -0.00181 -0.000273 -0.000668 -0.000654 Number of 
rivals (-1.36) (-0.02) (0.41) (-0.43) (-0.07) (-0.22) (-0.22) 
-0.310*** -0.314*** -0.321*** -0.374*** -0.386*** -0.273** -0.280*** Inefficiency (-2.94) (-3.00) (-3.04) (-3.27) (-3.37) (-2.56) (-2.59) 
1.999*** 1.910*** 2.116*** 2.188*** 2.465*** 2.022*** 2.181*** Risk (3.55) (3.37) (3.85) (3.05) (3.54) (3.33) (3.64) 
-0.0822 -0.119* -0.116 0.0405 0.0840 -0.122* -0.0898 M&A (-1.17) (-1.72) (-1.60) (0.43) (1.01) (-1.71) (-1.29) 
-0.246** -0.226*** -0.221** 0.395*** 0.427*** -0.217** -0.194** PostM&A (-2.55) (-2.65) (-2.50) (3.17) (3.59) (-2.44) (-2.11) 
-1.787*** -1.846*** -1.833*** -1.919*** -1.922*** -1.839*** -1.784*** Log(assets) (-7.51) (-7.85) (-8.15) (-7.09) (-7.62) (-7.75) (-7.45) 
-0.0354* -0.00133 -0.0126 0.0690 -0.0550 0.00793 -0.0190 MMCi (-1.66) (-0.07) (-0.72) (0.43) (-0.34) (0.32) (-0.87) 
3.89 0.278 1.56 -80.3 73.5 -0.897 3.79 MMCi
2a (1.58) (0.11) (0.71) (-0.42) (0.37) (-0.26) (1.25) 
Year effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
 -0.00533***  -0.00495**  -0.00840***  MMC 
externalities  (-3.12)  (-1.97)  (-4.29)  
 0.0618***  0.0572**  0.106***  MMC 
externalities2a  (3.24)  (2.21)  (4.56)  
  -0.00382***  -0.00274*  -0.00567*** MMC 
externalities of 
similar rivals   (-3.20)  (-1.74)  (-3.06) 
  0.140***  0.135***  0.188** MMC 
externalities of 
similar rivals2a   (6.03)  (4.74)  (2.30) 
  -0.00299**  -0.00327*  -0.00436*** MMC 
externalities of 
different rivals   (-2.30)  (-1.81)  (-3.15) 
  0.0528***  0.0606**  0.0690*** MMC 
externalities of 
different rivals2a   (2.86)  (2.54)  (3.53) 
N 1374 1374 1374 858 858 1251 1251 
R2 0.502 0.516 0.535 0.461 0.487 0.507 0.503 
Adj. R2 0.429 0.445 0.465 0.362 0.392 0.426 0.421 
    t statistics in parentheses 
    * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
    a  divided by 10000 
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Figure 1: Multimarket contact externalities in a context of strategic groups 
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Graph 1: Multimarket contact externalities of all rivals  
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Graph 2: Multimarket contact externalities produced by different and similar rivals  
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